

Content

1. Foreword	4
2. Vision Statements	6
3. Executive Summary 2008	7
4. Container Control Programme	8
4.1. Programme Components	
4.2. UNODC-WCO Partnership	
4.3. Programme Benefits	
4.4. Progress Reports by Country	
4.5. International Support	
5. Analysis Methodology	20
6. Illicit Drugs	22
6.1. General Overview	
6.2. Cocaine	
6.3. Cannabis	
6.4. Opiates	
6.5. Psychotropic Drugs	
6.6. Khat	
7. Precursor Chemicals	39
8. Cigarettes and Tobacco	42
8.1. Cigarettes	
8.2. Smoking Tobacco	
8.3. Water Pipe Tobacco	
8.4. Counterfeit Cigarettes	
9. Endangered Species	47
10. Counterfeit products (IPR – Intellectual Property Rights)	50
11. Other Categories	55
11.1. Currency	
11.2. Arms and Ammunition	
11.3. Evasion of Taxes and Customs Duties	
12. Special Items	61
12.1. Canada Border Services Agency	
12.2. Modus Operandi "RIP OFF"	
12.3. Counterfeit Medical Products	
13. Abbreviations	69

1. Foreword



The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) - World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme (CCP) went full steam ahead in 2008. Techniques learned during the CCP training are starting to show results. This year, in Karachi, port officials intercepted significant amounts of precursor chemicals used to convert morphine into heroin, as well as 8 tons of cannabis. Officials at the port of Guayaquil, Ecuador, seized several shipments of cocaine. In Ghana, officials at Port Tema intercepted a number of luxury cars.

The amount of contraband being seized is small by international standards. But this is a quantum leap for the port authorities involved. As a result, at these ports, the risks to organized crime are increasing, while vulnerability to illicit activity is decreasing.

The Container Control Programme is making waves beyond the ports taking part. Information that is being passed on by CCP trained officials is leading to seizures elsewhere. This trend should increase thanks to the innovative ContainerCOMM intelligence system. This system, developed by the WCO Secretariat, facilitates communications between ports and provides vital information that can be used for risk assessments and container profiling.

This year Turkmenistan became the first country in the Caspian Sea region to join the Programme. As part of a larger, region-wide UNODC strategy to strengthen border control between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, the expansion of the Container Control Programme to Turkmenistan will help strengthen crime control in this strategically located country.

The Programme has also been joined by a new partner, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA training will improve the detection of, and response to, the trafficking of nuclear material and other radio-active materials.

Considering the sheer volume of trade that is shipped via containers, we are still searching for needles in a haystack. But thanks to the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme, key ports in the developing world are becoming better equipped to identify and intercept these dangerous needles. This is a benefit to us all.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Antonio Maria Costa'.

Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



I am pleased to present the Annual Report on the UNODC-WCO Global Container Control Programme where significant progress has been made over the past year. New enforcement structures have been created both internationally and, on an inter-agency basis, at the national level. Five more countries joined the Container Control Programme in 2008, almost doubling the number of countries involved. Interest in this important initiative has, moreover, now seen it implemented in three of the six WCO Regions. In the near future, we hope to have well-functioning Joint Port Units established in two more WCO Regions.

The difficulties of fighting against illicit activities are well known, and enforcement officers are constantly required to adapt and change to new market trends and methods as they arise. Protection of the environment, public health and safety are of vital importance for the welfare of each and every individual. The Customs community is capable of successfully contributing at borders, for example by regulating cross-border movement of toxic and hazardous chemicals and wastes. Being aware that millions of containers are shipped around the world annually, the UNODC-WCO Global Container Control Programme is calling upon the private sector to come together, and to work closely with Customs and other relevant border control agencies with responsibilities in the movement of containerized cargo. The international trade community has much to offer the Customs community in moving toward the effective Customs control required in the 21st Century.

The global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 has brought with it two phenomena: Firstly, a shift of cargo transport from air to land and sea as a way of reducing transportation costs and, secondly, the heightened risk of tax evasion. Consequently, the essential role Customs plays in the international trade supply chain is more important than ever. The UNODC-WCO Global Container Control Programme is doing its part in ensuring that revenue collection, trade facilitation, and the fight against commercial fraud and smuggling are properly addressed.

A major precondition for successfully combating any kind of illegal cross-border activity is secure, accurate, timely and efficient exchange of information. It is also important to be able to quickly analyse information received so as to take appropriate enforcement measures. In order to meet this challenge, the WCO Secretariat has developed the communication tool 'Container Communication System', also known as 'ContainerCOMM'. This secure, encrypted, real-time Web-based system, tailor-made for the 'container area', is now available in four languages : English, French, Russian and Spanish. Many of the seizures made by the Port Control Units have been the result of alerts, information and intelligence sent through ContainerCOMM.

At the 28th Session of the WCO Enforcement Committee, held in February 2009, delegates endorsed the way in which the WCO and the UNODC are proceeding in terms of the Container Control Programme, including the publication of the Annual Global Container Analysis Report. The high-quality analysis in this Report was made by the dedicated staff of the WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Office for Central and Eastern Europe. I am convinced that this Report will continue to enrich and assist all those who are involved in container control in their daily work.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'Kunio Mikuriya'.

Kunio Mikuriya
Secretary General
World Customs Organization

2. Vision Statements

UNODC

*Towards Security and Justice for All
Making the World Safer from Drugs, Crime and Terrorism*

UNODC aims to counter the sinister trilogy of drugs, crime and terrorism and help strengthen the virtuous triad of peace, security and development. In short, UNODC aspires to be the world's conscience on drugs and crime, reminding States of their commitments and raising awareness about the need for drug control and crime prevention. It is also a service provider of technical assistance enabling States to address these threats.

WCO

The World Customs Organization is internationally acknowledged as the global centre of Customs expertise and plays a leading role in the discussion, development, promotion and implementation of modern and secure Customs systems and procedures. It is responsive to the needs of its Members and its strategic environment, and its instruments and best-practice approaches are recognized as the basis for sound Customs administration throughout the world.

3. Executive Summary 2008

This third UNODC-WCO Global Container Analysis Report is again the result of a combined effort by the WCO Secretariat and UNODC. The task of generating the data analysis this year was given to the **Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO) for Eastern and Central Europe in Warsaw, Poland**. The quality of their work is a significant addition to this report. Furthermore, this report would not have been possible without the active contribution and the collective endeavor of the WCO Member Countries, the RILO offices, and especially the customs, police and other law enforcement operatives throughout the world responsible for preventing maritime containers being used for drug trafficking and other organized crime activity.

The year was highlighted by an increasing number of seizures that were made as a result of successful joint operations and collective endeavors. However the analytical picture is far from complete because it does not take into account an indeterminate number of additional container related seizures that are not reported to the WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) database, particularly illicit drugs and precursor chemicals made by police and other drug law enforcement agencies in several important producer, transit and destination countries. There are still just a handful of opiate seizures and only limited number involving the smuggling of endangered species, arms and ammunition; there are none concerning stolen artifacts.

In addition to the analysis there is a special contribution from Interpol on the trafficking of pharmaceutical products and the work that is being done in this area to improve operational coordination and information exchange. Also included is a section, courtesy of Belgium Customs, about the modus operandi "Rip Off", which the analysis will demonstrate was prevalent throughout 2008 particularly for the trafficking of cocaine.

The nature of many of the illicit drug seizures referred to in this report, as in previous years, clearly demonstrates the extent to which regional traffickers make it exceedingly difficult, even with precise information, to locate concealments inside maritime containers. Nevertheless systematic analysis using standardized risk indicators coupled with real time access to all relevant information, as well as inter-agency cooperation and teamwork, are proving effective. It is also clear that maritime containers are being used for the bulk transshipment of all types of contraband and that in the case of illicit drugs legitimate cargo is easily contaminated exposing flaws in security that could easily be exploited for terrorism.

The report describes the progress being made by the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme (CCP) in the various country segments and its transition into a full global programme that is now taking place. The CCP's aim is to broker teamwork and cooperation enabling participating countries to more effectively and proactively target high risk containers for law enforcement scrutiny with minimum interference to legitimate trade, focusing on illicit drugs and transnational organized crime.

Operational success will be considerably enhanced through better working conditions, building partnerships, blending customs and policing skills, pooling resources, sharing information and mobilizing support. It is within this context that the CCP was framed and is now being implemented. It is a simple but challenging concept capable of producing measurable results.

4. Container Control Programme

4.1. Programme Components

The sheer volume of international maritime container traffic, the sophisticated and often ingenious concealment methods, along with the diverse routings adopted by illicit drug traffickers and other smugglers, invariably makes successful interdiction difficult. Seaports are notoriously difficult and at times dangerous places to work and law enforcement structures are often hampered by a lack of resources, inter-agency mistrust, complex port processes and systems, and other factors which are purposefully exploited by criminal organizations. The situation poses a very real and serious threat to the security of the international trade supply chain so important to sustainable development.

The Container Control Programme (CCP) concept was initiated in 2003 by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime together with the then Secretary General of the World Customs Organization. It was agreed that the WCO would act as the "Co-Executing Agency". As a result the CCP was developed by UNODC and WCO for the purpose of assisting governments to create sustainable enforcement structures in selected seaports to minimize the risk of maritime containers being exploited and used for illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and other forms of black market activity.

At the heart of this innovative approach is the creation of inter-agency port control units (PCUs) comprising analysts and search teams from different law enforcement agencies (e.g. Customs, Police) who are trained and equipped to work together to systematically target high risk containers for professional law enforcement scrutiny using risk analysis and other proactive techniques with minimum disruption to the free flow of legitimate trade. To enable access to relevant information and facilitate decision making, the PCUs are located within the port and/or container terminal and thus form an integral part of security measures.

In order to encourage ownership and address the complex nature of traditional inter-agency competition and antagonism, local steering committees comprising senior managers from the counterpart agencies, port authorities and UNODC meet periodically to discuss and support CCP implementation. The steering committees will monitor and evaluate progress, facilitate cooperation and access to essential shipping information, and ensure that agreed national inputs are fulfilled and sustained beyond the lifetime of the CCP. Adequate accommodation and access to relevant shipping information, as well management support, are just some of the key motivating factors that typically need to be addressed. It is important to point out that the CCP does not seek to change the statutory roles and responsibilities of any of the participating enforcement agencies, but rather to promote the interaction and teamwork necessary for effective interdiction.

The CCP supports the formation of strategic alliances between Customs, trade, and enforcement communities as a joint means to prevent the abuse of legitimate commercial trade for the purposes of organized crime. In particular it seeks to encourage information exchange and the sharing of limited resources (human, technical and logistical) particularly within ports and container terminals.

Furthermore, the CCP facilitates cooperation with relevant international agencies involved in regulating and monitoring maritime container traffic.

4.2. UNODC – WCO Partnership

The partnership between UNODC and WCO is based on an existing agreement of cooperation with a long lasting tradition. UNODC and WCO have successfully worked together on a number of international activities such as the projects 'Drug Trafficking through the Mail in Africa' (interception of drugs via mail) and 'Development of Drug Control Capacity in the Seaports of Eastern and Southern Africa' (African Seaports Project).

The CCP is managed by UNODC and WCO coordinators who in turn work in close cooperation with UNODC Regional Law enforcement Advisors and UNODC Country Offices. Within the CCP the two organizations are responsible for specific facets of the programme.

UNODC'S RESPONSIBILITIES:

UNODC's role is the global administration and development of the CCP including fund raising, external relations and reporting, and the implementation and coordination arrangements of CCP activities in the participating countries through the respective UNODC Field Offices and in close cooperation with WCO.

Through its Programme Coordinator, UNODC develops all avenues of potential cooperation with international organizations and bilateral partners, international trade associations and UN agencies. National project managers appointed by UNODC play a key role in day-to-day implementation of CCP activities in each country, helping to build confidence and ensuring that problem areas are resolved without delay.

UNODC actively promotes the expansion of the CCP to other countries. The process of incorporation into the CCP is subject to certain standard preconditions being met by each new country. Thereafter the expected timeframe for delivery and completion of activities will vary from country to country:

Preconditions:

- Letter of intent signed between UNODC and the selected government agreeing to CCP implementation.
- Port assessment undertaken to determine feasibility, proposed implementation arrangements, as well as training and equipment requirements.

Within 9 months:

- National project manager appointed.
- Inter-agency steering group established.
- Cooperation agreement and working procedures drafted and signed by the participating agencies.

9 – 15 months:

- Theoretical training completed.
- Inter-agency Port Control Unit established, equipped, and staffed by CCP trained personnel.

15 – 24 months:

- Practical on-site training delivered.
- Work study tour to a benchmark container port undertaken.
- Evaluation and review.

WCO RESPONSIBILITIES:

WCO is responsible for the development, management and implementation of the training programme. WCO Members currently provide English, French, Portuguese and Spanish speaking trainers. This Members' in-kind contribution is critical for providing the CCP with high quality training and for controlling costs.

The trainer's pool established by the WCO Secretariat currently consists of trainers from Argentina, Belgium, France, Germany, Ghana, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom. Select trainers meet annually together with national and international programme coordinators to review progress, discuss training needs and considerations for each country. This meeting also provides the opportunity to meet with representatives from other international organizations to discuss areas of mutual interest; particularly the training programme.

WCO is responsible for the annual publication of the Global Container Analysis Report.

According to the SAFE Framework of Standards and other co-operational initiatives that focus on facilitating legitimate trade, the Customs-to-Business Partnership offers a high degree of security guarantees in terms of their role in the supply chain. Accordingly, the WCO keeps in close contact with trade associations and promotes the cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies and the private sector. A trusting and sustainable cooperation between the PCUs and the private sector is one precondition for the success of the CCP.

The 6-week training component for PCU team members is divided into two parts. The first 3 weeks are set aside for in-depth theoretical training, with the remaining 3 weeks being devoted to the practical application of the various techniques for the selection/inspection of high risk containers and the important management systems, operational procedures and safeguards that are necessary (see photos). Ideally all the training is conducted in the seaport in order to educate staff about profiling and inspection under local conditions. Additional practical training including longer periods of mentoring may be provided to meet local requirements. Teamwork and integrity are core values that are promoted throughout the training period and beyond, as well as the need to produce measurable results.



(Courtesy of JPCU, Ghana)



(Courtesy of Clifford Craig)

Training topics focus on the practical application of proven practices and procedures and are adapted to meet the particular needs of individual countries. Core elements include:

- **Maritime Containers:** history; construction; various types; growth in container trade; regulation and markings.
- **Integrity and Teamwork:** inter-agency cooperation; integrity best practices.
- **Intelligence-Led Drug/Crime Controls:** risk analysis; risk assessment; profiling and targeting; standardized risk assessments; information sources; information sharing; global strategies; investigation techniques; mutual administrative assistance; post seizure investigations.
- **Port Security:** ISPS code; trade facilitation; private sector cooperation; criminal organizations working in seaports.
- **Searching Maritime Containers and Vehicles:** general principles; health and safety; examination; search; basic inspection tools; concealment methods; seal tampering.
- **Precursor Chemicals:** controlling the chemical trade; chemical diversion; recognition; testing.
- **Secure Communications:** WCO ContainerCOMM; WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN); Interpol I-24/7.
- **Specialist Areas:** Counterfeit material including medical and tobacco products; trafficking of protected and endangered species (CITES); nuclear and radioactive materials.
- **Training Resources:** WCO e-learning; UNODC Computer Based Training (CBT).

Training, which is based upon the relevant provisions of an array of international instruments and tools, is delivered by a team of experts with operational customs and police experience in container controls, investigation techniques, and international law enforcement cooperation. WCO Members provide the lead trainer who is in turn supplemented by topic-specific national and international experts including representatives from INTERPOL, the respective WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO) and other appropriate national, international and/or regional organizations.

At the conclusion of the training period provision is made for selected participants from the PCUs to attend a work study tour to a benchmark seaport with proven experience of best practices in the field of container controls.

ContainerCOMM

ContainerCOMM is an internet based, secure, multifunctional communication system developed by the WCO Secretariat under the framework of the CCP for the purpose of facilitating the encrypted exchange of sensitive information, particularly the movement of suspected high risk containers, between the Port Control Units (PCUs), other authorized Users in participating countries and, in the near future, the eleven Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILOs).

This information is sent by way of three distinct types of pre-formatted messages, namely **WARNING** messages concerning the movement of suspected high-risk maritime containers, **FEEDBACK** messages detailing the action taken, and **SEIZURE** messages providing the type and quantity of illicit goods seized and other relevant information.

ContainerCOMM, which requires no special installation, is provided free to participating CCP members. It is currently available in English, French, Russian and Spanish. Some additional features include:

- **MAILBOX** enabling authorized users to send secure EMAIL messages to other Users either manually or from automated lists
- **LIBRARY** to store and view container related information from a variety of sources particularly details of any new seizures
- Automatically generates emails to one or more email accounts advising users of any relevant activity including **WARNING**, **FEEDBACK** or **SEIZURE** messages, private exchanges of emails, and uploads to the **LIBRARY**
- **CONTAINER NUMBER CHECKER** allows users to verify the 10-digit container number and authenticity of the check digit
- **HELP DESK** support provided by the WCO Secretariat

ContainerCOMM is continually being enhanced by the WCO Secretariat to meet user requirements including the development of linkages with commercial databases and other relevant applications. The recent decision, for example, to include authorized Customs officials from each of the eleven RILO offices is an important development and will enable the dissemination of information to a country not affiliated with the CCP, especially any appropriate action on **WARNING** messages originating from a PCU.

The system is already proving effective and has resulted in a number of cocaine seizures in Europe including 143 kg (photo) seized by Belgium Customs in the port of Antwerp as a direct result of a **WARNING** message sent from Ecuador. The presence of a duplicate set of seals (photo) suggests the modus operandi was "Rip Off".



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)

4.3. Programme benefits

- Professional training by technical experts from WCO, UNODC and other international and organizations including the private sector.
- Blended learning concept that combines on-site theoretical training, practical field training, e-learning modules and work study tours.
- Negotiated inter-agency cooperation agreements facilitating the creation of inter-agency Port Control Units.
- Adoption of systematic risk assessment and proactive targeting techniques to more effectively identify high risk containers.
- Improved real-time access to container and shipping information.
- Membership in a global enforcement community; access to innovative information and communications technology.
- Achieve the important alliance between Customs and trade in the delicate balance between compliance and trade facilitation.
- The ability to respond to the threats terrorism poses on maritime freight containers and the international trade supply chain.

At the global level the CCP will result in better coordination and synergy between the various agencies, and improve the collection, standardization and reporting of container related data for use in strategic analysis and dissemination.

4.4. Progress Reports by Country

The initial four pilot countries - Ecuador, Ghana, Pakistan and Senegal – have been joined in 2008 by Turkmenistan. In addition, preliminary discussions were started with a view to introducing the CCP in a number of countries in Central and South America, Central Asia and West Africa.

ECUADOR

In 2005 Ecuador was the first pilot country to be incorporated into the CCP. Progress to date has been encouraging, particularly the extent to which the National Police (PNE), Customs Corporation (CAE) including its operational arm the Customs Surveillance Service (SVA) and the National Drug Control Commission (CONSEP) are working together as an inter-agency port control unit (PCU) producing measurable results in the seaport of Guayaquil.

Previous random selection/inspection has been replaced by systematic risk assessment and other proactive profiling techniques to identify only high risk shipping containers for examination by PNE drug dog teams supported by SVA officials. Since operations started in 2006, the PCU has intercepted more than 70 freight containers and seized precursor chemicals, almost 10 metric tons cocaine, several shipments of endangered/protected species, and other smuggled goods.

Other critical components have been the unprecedented support from CAE senior management, the development of strategic alliances with the private sector especially the Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC), as well as logistical support and cooperation including new office accommodation for all the control agencies (see photo) from the port operator, Contecon Guayaquil SA (CGSA), a subsidiary of International Container Terminal Services, Inc (ICTSI).



(Courtesy of Clifford Craig)

The improvement in the real time exchange of information and law enforcement cooperation continued in 2008 with further cocaine seizures reported in Antwerp, Belgium as a direct result of alerts sent by the Guayaquil PCU via ContainerCOMM. Furthermore, CAE is successfully applying the same techniques to target the smuggling of counterfeit products with more than 100 cases under investigation in 2008.

The cocaine seizures in Guayaquil clearly demonstrate the extent to which regional traffickers make it exceedingly difficult for the control agencies to identify not only a suspect high risk container, but also the method and/or location of the particular concealment. Even with supplied information cocaine is

difficult to find. Risk analysis and teamwork, however, have proven effective resulting in the discovery of several large concealments that would have previously gone undetected.

Practical training in 2008 focused on the proactive targeting and inspection of maritime containers not only for illicit drugs but also IPR infringements, protected/endangered species, and precursor chemicals. This was followed by a work study tour to Cartagena, Colombia specifically designed to give PCU operatives the opportunity to exchange ideas and techniques with colleagues faced with similar challenges in interdicting cocaine shipments in maritime containers, as well as to strengthen law enforcement cooperation between the two countries.

Although planned activities in Ecuador are now complete the CCP will continue to provide technical assistance, if requested, for the purpose of establishing similar controls based upon inter-agency cooperation and private sector support in other ports.

GHANA

For many years significant quantities of herbal cannabis, concealed in national produce exported from Port Tema, have been seized in European ports. This trend continued in 2008 with two reported seizures of 5,500 kg and 3,800kg in Hamburg, Germany, and Antwerp, Belgium, respectively; the cover loads in both cases were pineapples. Ghana is also one of the countries in West Africa vulnerable to the threat posed by the rapidly expanding trans-Atlantic cocaine trafficking route. As a result, some imports originating in Latin America should be suspect and export goods should inevitably be exploited for the onward transshipment of the cocaine to Europe. Counterfeit medicines imported from the Far East through Port Tema, a major risk to the health and security of the population, are widely available in local markets. These medicines are not only ineffective and/or toxic, but promote the emergence of drug resistance due to the fact that they are often produced with sub-therapeutic doses of the active pharmaceutical ingredients. Ghana is also an important entry point for counterfeit cigarettes that are widely available in the country. Hence Ghana was chosen as a pilot country.

Following theoretical training an inter-agency PCU became operational in October 2008 within the container terminal at Port Tema. Staffing comprises officials from the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), the National Police, the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) and the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GPHA).

Practical training was also delivered in 2008 focusing on profiling and targeting high risk containers, and adopting procedures to harmonize the different competences and working procedures in consultation with the relevant port authorities. During training, profiling exercises by the students themselves resulted in the seizure of sub-standard medicines. The training also provided the opportunity to brief the senior managers of the counterpart agencies and other stakeholders about the important role of the PCU and what they must do to ensure its success and sustainability.

The CCP has laid the foundation for effective container controls within Port Tema. There has been some initial success. Less than one month after the conclusion of the practical training, the PCU intercepted 3 stolen luxury cars, an *Audi A8*, a *Mercedes S320*, and a *Porsche Cayenne* (see photos) that had arrived in 2 maritime containers from Spain declared as personal effects.



(Courtesy of PCU, Port Tema)



(Courtesy of PCU, Port Tema)

The Container Control Programme PCU is the first of its kind in Ghana. Prior to its existence container profiling to uncover organized crime activities was not taking place. Customs was the only agency regularly controlling import containers, but primarily aimed at generating state revenue and preventing/detecting fiscal offences.

While the mixed composition of the team is one of its greatest challenges, the approach of integrating several law enforcement agencies into one single unit has proven beneficial, particularly with regards to a more direct and real time exchange of operational information and the availability of different competences and authorities within one team.

PAKISTAN

The two main counterpart agencies are Pakistan Customs (FBR) and the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF). The priority sites chosen for CCP implementation are the container terminals in Karachi, Pakistan's largest and busiest seaport, and in Port Qasim. Once completed at these two sites, activities will be replicated at strategic inland dry ports located in Lahore, Faisalabad, Sambrial (Sialkot), Chamman (Quetta), Torkham (Peshawar), Multan and Sust.

Progress to date in implementing a wide range of CCP activities in both Karachi Port and Port Qasim has been encouraging:

- Theoretical training for both ANF and FBR completed (January 2008) in the United Arab Emirates with the participation of colleagues from the host country.

- Existing FBR and ANF office accommodation ameliorated (by the counterpart agencies themselves) resulting in improved working conditions.
- Computer and communications equipment installed including internet access.
- Inspection tools, plus portable devices to determine the identity of hazardous and toxic chemicals including precursors, and vehicles delivered.
- First on-site practical training completed (January 2009).

The refurbished offices in Karachi Port are located in the same building and adjacent to one another to encourage interaction and cooperation between the FBR and ANF. The Karachi Port Trust (KPT), which administers port operations and security, is actively participating in CCP development.

One of the most positive developments is the extent to which PCU officials are now putting into practice the proactive and other targeting techniques they learned during CCP training. Since initial training a number of sizeable seizures of precursor chemicals and illicit drugs in maritime containers have been reported by both the FBR and ANF at or near Karachi Port: 3 separate cannabis seizures: 267 kg, 2,300 kg, and one of 5,000 kg concealed behind the false wall of a container (see photo); 14,000 kg acetic anhydride, a precursor used in the illicit production of heroin; 4,500 kg acetyl chloride, a hazardous and difficult substance to handle which is a precursor to acetic anhydride and can be used directly to convert morphine into heroin. Seizures of acetic anhydride are rare in this region, this being the first since 2001. Such an amount (14,000 kg) could have been used in the production of at least 5,600 kg heroin.



(Courtesy of ANF, Pakistan)



(Courtesy of ANF, Pakistan)

SENEGAL

Like Ghana, Senegal is considered a potential transit country for cocaine shipments to Europe as well as an entry point for counterfeit products from the Far East, particularly medicines and other pharmaceutical products as well as cigarettes and tobacco. Although there were no reported seizures in 2008 the PCU remains vigilant, is an effective deterrent, and will benefit from plans to expand the CCP to the nearby Cape Verde islands in 2009.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan is the first country in the Caspian Sea region to become part of the CCP. Opium and heroin enter directly from neighboring Afghanistan or via the Islamic Republic of Iran for transshipment along the "Northern Route" to markets in the Russian Federation and Europe. According to officials figures released by the Government more than 3 tons of illicit drugs (mostly opium) were seized in Turkmenistan in 2006 and a similar amount in 2007. It is also believed to be a transshipment country for some of the precursor chemicals needed in the process of converting opium into morphine and heroin. Weapons, radioactive materials, counterfeit products, protected/endangered species, as well as items of cultural heritage are also potentially being smuggled through the Caspian Sea region.

CCP activities began in 2008 with a preliminary assessment mission followed by theoretical training in the port of Turkmenbashi attended by law enforcement officials from State Customs Service (SCS), State Drug Control Service (SDCS), State Border Service (SBS), Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Transport Police and the National Sea and River Authority.

The integration of Turkmenistan into the CCP is a positive development and will be the catalyst for enhanced law enforcement cooperation and interdiction in the Caspian Sea region. Accordingly, CCP activities will complement and support the UNODC/Paris Pact Rainbow Strategy Action Plan, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), as well as the EU Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA).

4.5. International Support

Current CCP donor countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). In addition the CCP has received in-kind contributions from Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Norway, Spain, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UK.

International and not-for-profit organizations actively supporting CCP implementation include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC) and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

The IAEA, for example, participated in several CCP related activities with UNODC and WCO during 2008. The first of these was the theoretical training part of the Pakistan segment. This was followed by an evaluation mission to Turkmenistan and participation in the subsequent training as well as attending the annual CCP meeting in Vienna. Working with UNODC and WCO in the training activities allows the IAEA Nuclear Security Programme to reinforce its established relationships with frontline officers and to enhance their capabilities in detecting and responding to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The additional knowledge gained from the IAEA contribution to their training enhances detection and response capabilities, as well as safety. As part of a broader strategy to expand cooperation and coordination of its activities with other international organizations whose work contributes to enhancing global nuclear security, the IAEA, through its Office of Nuclear Security, looks forward to continuing to work with UNODC and WCO on the implementation of the CCP in the future.

5. Analysis Methodology

The purpose of this analysis is to produce a global overview, based upon available data, of the extent to which maritime containers were used during 2008 for the purpose of illicit drug trafficking and other smuggling activity typically associated with transnational organized crime.

The analysis is based upon the seizure data for the period from 1st January until 31st December 2008 entered into the WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) database by member countries through the respective RILO offices in Central/Eastern Europe (Poland), Asia/Pacific (China), Central Africa (Cameroon), CIS (Russian Federation), Eastern/Southern Africa (Kenya), Joint Intelligence Office (Caribbean), Middle East (Saudi Arabia), North Africa (Morocco), South America (Chile), West Africa (Senegal), and Western Europe (Germany).

The majority of reported seizures are those purely made by Customs as well as an increasing number that are made as a result of Customs and law enforcement cooperation. One of the many examples of the latter was the discovery of 170 kg cocaine packed in plastic pipes inside several hollowed-out wood pieces (see photos) in a shipment from Peru. The seizure and subsequent arrests were a direct result of cooperation between Dutch and French Customs and authorities in Peru.



(Courtesy of Dutch Customs)

The analysis has been divided into the following commodity-based sections: illicit drugs; precursor chemicals; cigarettes/tobacco; counterfeit goods/IPR; currency; arms/ammunition; the evasion of taxes and customs duties. Additionally the trafficking in endangered species of fauna and flora (CITES) is included for the first time despite the small but no less significant number of cases compared to other types of contraband.

Unlike previous reports in the section on illicit drugs the analysis is not broken down into regional overviews but instead focuses on the main drug types smuggled in maritime containers. The analysis focuses on both the number of seizures and the quantities seized by country/region with additional

information on concealment methods and cover loads, all supported by graphs, charts and, where available, relevant photographs.

The analysis does not take into account an indeterminate number of container related seizures made by police and other drug law enforcement agencies in several important producer, transit and destination countries that are not reported in CEN. Nevertheless the number of reported seizures in most categories, as well as the number of countries, is considerably higher than in 2007.

The sections dealing with illicit drugs, precursor chemicals and cigarettes/tobacco are supplemented in Section 10 (Special Items) by additional information provided to WCO by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

Some 44 photographs have been included to illustrate some of the more interesting seizures and/or concealment methods. Supplementary information and photographs can also be found on a number of websites that are listed in Section 13 (Useful Websites).

6. Illicit Drugs

6.1. General Overview

This analysis is divided into 5 main drug categories: cocaine, cannabis, psychotropic drugs, opiates and khat. There was a substantial increase in the number of countries reporting illicit drug seizures and the number of actual seizures. A positive feature was the number of illicit drug seizures, 34% of the total, that were made as a direct result of inter-agency and cross border cooperation. Not only does this facilitate targeted container controls but also enables the agencies to work more effectively together to dismantle trafficking organizations. Whilst this cooperation is encouraging there are still an indeterminate number of container related seizures made in several important producer, transit and destination countries that are not recorded simply because the (lead) agency involved was not Customs.

6.1.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

There were 122 reported seizures of illicit drugs in 2008, a significant increase compared to 76 seizures the previous year and 104 in 2006. The total quantity seized was lower at 68,058 kg compared to 82,771 kg in 2007 but slightly higher than the 62,879 kg in 2006.

Table 6.1: Number of seizures and quantity seized

	2008	2007	2006
Number	122	76	104
Quantity (kg)	68,058	82,771	62,879

The 122 reported seizures were made by 28 different countries compared to 19 the previous year, a one third increase. The country with the highest total number of recorded seizures was Belgium (33) followed by Australia (16) and Spain (15). The highest total quantity seized was by The Netherlands mainly due to a single seizure of 19,000 kg cannabis in the Port of Rotterdam. Although Germany made only 4 drug seizures, the total quantity was the second highest due to significant cannabis seizures made in the Port of Hamburg.

Table 6.2: Top ten countries by total quantity seized (kg)

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Netherlands	11	19 770
Germany	4	9 508
Vietnam	1	8 800
Pakistan	5	7 080
Belgium	33	6 193
Australia	16	4 486
Portugal	5	2 762
Yemen	2	1 792
Spain	15	1 697
Russia	2	1 282

With regard to the regional (RILO) ranking of the 122 worldwide seizures, 8 countries in Western Europe reported 74 (40,689 kg); 6 countries in Asia/Pacific reported 27 (21,568 kg); 4 countries in South America reported 8 (1,816 kg); 5 countries in East Central Europe reported 6 (688 kg); 1 country in CIS reported 2 (1,282 kg); 3 countries in the the Middle East reported 5 (1,845 kg); 1 country in West Africa reported 2 (172 kg). There were no seizures reported from the four other RILO regions: Caribbean, Central Africa, Eastern/Southern Africa, and North Africa.

6.1.2. DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES

An unexpected trend emerged from available data that relatively few countries featured as both countries of departure and seizure. Essentially it appears that either container controls at the ports of origin are not effective or that seizures are taking place but not reported on CEN. Pakistan, which is one of the major departure countries for both cannabis and heroin, reported several seaport seizures of cannabis but not opiates. In addition, Argentina, Ecuador and Paraguay all reported cocaine seizures in their respective seaports. There were no seizures on CEN reported from either Colombia or Peru although information from open sources indicates many successful and significant cocaine seizures by specialist police units did take place.

Table 6.3: Number of seizures reported at departure countries

Country	Cocaine	Cannabis
Pakistan		5
Argentina	3	
Ecuador	2	
Paraguay	1	
Total	6	5

Of the top 10 countries making seizures (Table 6.2), the majority were the actual country of final destination of the container. All of the seizures reported in The Netherlands and Australia, for example, were in this category; Germany and Portugal reported almost 90% as such. Belgium was the final destination for 30 of their reported 33 seizures; the other 3 seizures were in transit and en-route to The Netherlands.

Table 6.4: Seizures at final destinations

Country	Cocaine	Cannabis	Opiates	Psychotropic	Khat
Belgium	30				
Australia	7		1	8	
Spain	11	2			
Netherlands	9	2			
Portugal	4				
Germany	1	2			
Italy	3				
Ireland		1	1		
Kuwait			2		
New Zealand					2
Philippines				2	
Yemen				2	
Israel	1				
Japan				1	
Lebanon	1				
Montenegro	1				
Pakistan		1			
Russia	1				
Slovakia	1				
Total	70	8	4	13	2

10 countries reported intercepting 14 drug shipments prior to the arrival of the container at its declared country of final destination. More than 70% of these cases involved cocaine.

Table 6.5: Seizures before reaching final destination

Drug	Routing and country of seizure (in bold)	Number of seizures
Opiates	Bulgaria – Turkey – Russia - Kazakhstan	1
Cocaine	Colombia - Costa Rica – Portugal - Italy	1
Cocaine	Colombia – Slovenia – Unknown - Netherlands	1
Cocaine	Colombia – Unknown – Slovenia - Croatia	1
Cocaine	Costa Rica – Ukraine - Moldova	1
Cocaine	Cape Verde – Portugal - Spain	1
Cocaine	Ecuador – Brazil - Belgium	1
Cocaine	Ecuador – Spain - France	1
Cocaine	Ecuador – Croatia - Montenegro (See Photo)	1
Cocaine	Ecuador – Bahamas – Belgium - Netherlands	1
Cocaine	Venezuela – Jamaica – Belgium - Netherlands	1
Cannabis	Ghana – Belgium - Netherlands	1
Cannabis	Pakistan – Germany – Poland - Ukraine	1
Cannabis	Pakistan – Vietnam – China - Canada	1

Croatian Customs in the Port of Rijeka, for example, intercepted 15 kg cocaine concealed inside boxes of frozen fruit juice (see photo) shipped from Ecuador via Hamburg (Germany) and Malta. The container was monitored through to its final destination in Montenegro enabling local police to make 2 arrests.



(Courtesy of Montenegro Customs)

A total of 18 countries were specifically identified as the country of origin but in only 62 of the 122 seizures. Cocaine featured in all the seizures originating in the top 5 countries of reported origin.

Table 6.6: Top five countries of origin


Origin	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Colombia	15	1,506
Ecuador	10	1,525
Peru	5	321
Costa Rica	5	156
Panama	4	478
Total	39	3,986

6.2. Cocaine

6.2.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED


20 countries reported cocaine seizures, 8 more than the previous year. Both the total number of seizures (87) and the total amount seized (11,882 kg) increased significantly compared with the previous year (34 and 4,419 kg respectively). The number of seizures was also higher than the 76 reported in 2006 but the total quantity seized was significantly lower than the 25,128 kg that year. More than half (60%) of all cocaine seizures were made in European countries.

Graph 6.1: Number (in parenthesis) and quantity (kg) of cocaine seizures 2006-2008



5 countries accounted for 76% of the total number of cocaine seizures. Belgium reported the highest number (32) followed by Spain (13), The Netherlands (9), Australia (7), and Portugal (5). Nine countries reported a total of 16 cocaine seizures exceeding 200 kg. Portugal reported the largest seizure (1,391 kg) in a shipment of frozen octopus.

Graph 6.2: Cocaine seizures over 200 kg



6.2.2. COCAINE ROUTINGS

There was a notable increase in the number of cocaine transshipments into Europe via countries in Central America and the Caribbean. 2 were detected in Antwerp, Belgium arrived via Freeport, Bahamas, one of which (560 kg) was en-route to Rotterdam. Kingston, Jamaica was the transit port for a cocaine shipment arriving in Antwerp from Venezuela. The Dominican Republic was a transit country for cocaine in a shipment originating in Venezuela en-route to Portugal. Panama and Costa Rica also featured in cocaine seizures in Lebanon and Ukraine respectively.

In addition to the transatlantic trafficking routes into Western Europe there was a significant increase in routings through the Mediterranean. 5 seizures were reported in Italy in the ports of Salerno, Savona and Genoa. Italy also featured as a transit country in 2 shipments originating in Colombia and later seized in Spain and Portugal. Customs in Lebanon detected 38 kg concealed in timber arriving in Beirut from Chile via Panama, Spain and Egypt. Ukrainian Customs in the Port of Odessa on the Black Sea discovered cocaine concealed in a shipment of canned pineapple shipped from Costa Rica and en-route to neighboring Moldova.

Montenegro featured twice as country of destination for 2 cocaine shipments from Ecuador via Croatia. In one particularly interesting case Slovenian Customs intercepted 381 kg cocaine in the Port of Koper concealed in the oil tank of a hydraulic press (see photos) shipped from Colombia via Costa Rica and Italy. The cocaine was only found after a careful and difficult examination using specialist tools, protective clothing and safety equipment. The cocaine was actually suspended in the liquid content of the tanks and the mixture had to be drained into plastic barrels and taken to the Police Laboratory for analysis. This case was yet another example of effective inter-agency and cross border cooperation resulting not only in the discovery of a difficult concealment but also the arrest of two Croatian nationals.



(Courtesy of Slovenian Customs)

Apart from Europe, Australia featured as the destination country in 7 cocaine seizures. The departure countries in these cases were reported as Canada (3), China (2), USA (1) and Mexico (1).

65% of the total number of reported seizures concerned shipments originating in South America namely Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia and Ecuador featured as the 2 most frequently reported departure countries followed by Peru and Costa Rica.

Table 6.7: Cocaine departure countries by quantity (kg)

Departure country	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Ecuador	19	2,525
Colombia	21	1,999
Argentina	5	1,701
Venezuela	2	1,476
Peru	10	901
Gambia	1	514
Mexico	2	488
Panama	4	478
Canada	3	372
Costa Rica	7	275
Cape Verde	2	275
China	2	500
Curacao	2	140
Guyana	1	102
USA	1	65
Chile	2	52
Paraguay	1	11
Suriname	2	8
Total	87	11,882

Only 2 countries in West Africa featured in cocaine seizures. In one case a total of 514 kg was intercepted in Lisbon, Portugal arriving from the Gambia. The other country was Cape Verde which reported 2 seizures (172 kg and 103 kg respectively), with Portugal as the final destination country. South Africa also appeared as a transit country for 43 kg originating in Ecuador and detected in St. Petersburg, Russia.

The top 4 destination countries, accounting for 72% of the total number of reported seizures were Belgium (31), Spain (15), The Netherlands (12) and Portugal (5). These 4 countries also accounted for almost 78% (9,229 kg) of the total amount (11,882 kg) seized. Portugal seized the highest total quantity (2,831 kg).

Table 6.8: Cocaine destination countries


Destination country	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Portugal	5	2,831
Spain	15	2,539
Belgium	31	2,374
Netherlands	12	1,485
Australia	7	947
Italy	5	640
Croatia	1	382
Panama	1	229
Slovakia	1	164
Israel	1	104
Russia	1	43
Moldova	1	40
Lebanon	1	38
Montenegro	2	30
Germany	1	20
Ukraine	1	11
France	1	7
Total	87	11,882

6.2.3. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT

Concealment methods in maritime containers are divided into three main categories. **In freight:** within or amongst the actual cargo. **In transport:** in the structure of the container including the mechanical department of refrigerated containers. **Rip off:** contraband placed inside the container near the doors and without the knowledge of the shipper/consignee.


As in previous years the highest number of cocaine seizures was reported under the category "in freight". There was a significant increase in each of the categories; triple in the case of "in transport", but the greatest increase was in the category "rip off". Further information about the modus operandi "rip off" can be found under Special Items (Section 12).

Graph 6.3: Methods of concealment by number and quantity



Four countries reported "rip off" seizures: Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The largest single seizure was 640 kg; 7 other seizures exceeded 100 kg.

Graph 6.4: Number (in parenthesis) and quantity (kg) of "rip off" seizures by country



A further category, "in premises", was used to describe the seizure of 20 kg in Leverkusen, Germany. Although this seizure took place inland it was taken into consideration as it was established that the cocaine had arrived in a maritime container from Colombia via Antwerp, Belgium.


6.2.4. COVER LOADS

Cover loads were reported in 40 cocaine seizures totaling 3,142 kg. In the remaining 47 seizures (8,740 kg) the cover load was reported as "unknown".

The most frequently reported cover load category, 16 seizures in total, was "food" and included fruits, frozen vegetables, canned tuna fish, and green tea. The largest individual amount seized was 1,391 kg inside boxes of frozen octopus followed by 627 kg in a consignment of garlic. Other reported cover loads in 13 seizures totaling 1,779 kg were furniture (5), machinery (2), timber (1), drinks (1), plants (1) and building materials (1). The category "other", recorded in 11 seizures totaling 1,039 kg, was used to describe atypical cover loads for example fiberglass foot spas or scrap metal.

An interesting cover load, reported by Slovakian Customs in Dunajska Streda, was bottled Argentinean wine in 2 containers shipped from South America via Germany and the Czech Republic. During the control it was noticed that some of the cardboard cartons were heavier than others. The bottles inside these particular cartons contained a viscous liquid with crystals which was later confirmed by the Customs laboratory to be cocaine. In total 35 boxes (420 bottles) were found to contain a total of 163.8 kg cocaine. The importer of the shipment was a Slovakian company owned by a Hungarian national.

Cocaine concealments are often difficult to detect irrespective of the cover load. Customs officers in the Port of Antwerp, Belgium, selected a shipment of water pumps arriving from Venezuela via Jamaica en-route to Rotterdam in The Netherlands. Although no irregularities were apparent during routine scanning drug sniffer dogs reacted positively. It was only after dismantling the water pumps and drilling the internal fly wheels that a total of 85 kg cocaine was found compacted inside. Subsequent inter-agency and cross border cooperation resulted in a number of arrests in The Netherlands.



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)

6.3. Cannabis

6.3.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

Cannabis seizures, 15 in total, were reported in 7 countries. Seizures exceeding 3,000 kg were reported in 5 of these 7 countries. 60% of the total number of seizures took place in Europe and the remaining 40% in Asian countries where the drug is also produced. The largest individual seizure (19,002 kg) was recorded in The Netherlands.

Table 6.9: Cannabis, number of seizures and quantity

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Netherlands	2	19,002
Germany	3	9,488
Vietnam	1	8,800
Pakistan	5	7,080
Belgium	1	3,801
Ireland	1	110
Spain	2	98
Total	15	48,379

Total amount of cannabis seized was 48,379 kg comprising 28,273 kg herbal cannabis, 20,088 kg cannabis resin, and 18 kg cannabis oil. There were more seizures of cannabis resin (10) than herbal cannabis (4). The cannabis oil was discovered in a larger shipment of herbal cannabis in the Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, originating in Ghana.

6.3.2. CANNABIS ROUTINGS

There were 5 different countries of departure. Ghana featured as the main departure country for herbal cannabis; Pakistan, Senegal and Morocco were the departure countries for cannabis resin.

Table 6.10: Cannabis departure countries

Departure	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Ghana	4	28,289
Pakistan	7	19,880
Unknown	1	110
Senegal	1	64
Morocco	1	34
Surinam	1	2
Total	15	48,379

Three of the 4 shipments of herbal cannabis were destined for The Netherlands; the other was seized in Germany. In 2 seizures cannabis resin was destined for Spain. German Customs in the seaport of Hamburg intercepted 4,000 kg of cannabis resin in transit to Ukraine via Poland. Canada was the only non-European destination country following the interception by Customs in Vietnam of 8,880 kg cannabis resin en route to Canada via China. The destination country in one third of the reported cases (5) was in the category "unknown".

Table 6.11: Cannabis destination countries

Destination	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Netherlands	3	22,803
Canada	1	8,800
Unknown	5	7,080
Germany	2	5,488
Ukraine	1	4,000
Ireland	1	110
Spain	2	98
Total	15	48,379

6.3.3. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT

"In freight" was the concealment method in 85% of the total number of cases resulting in 41,201 kg being seized. "In transport" accounted for just 98 kg. Spanish Customs reported one "rip off" case involving 34 kg of cannabis resin from Morocco.

6.3.4. COVER LOADS

The most frequently used cover loads were under the categories "food", "ceramics" and "textiles". Sacks of cashew nuts were the cover load (see photos below) used to conceal the largest shipment of 19 tons cannabis intercepted in the Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, coming from Ghana.



(Courtesy of Dutch Customs)



(Courtesy of Dutch Customs)

Pineapples featured in 2 large seizures in Ports of Antwerp, Belgium and Hamburg, Germany, within a week of each other; both shipments originating in Ghana. In one of these cases Belgium Customs discovered 3,800 kg packed in boxes (see photos) towards the rear of a refrigerated container that was en-route to The Netherlands. The case in Hamburg featured 5,500 kgs in a similar shipment en route to Denmark.



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)

6.4. Opiates

Despite significant growth in opiate production in recent years, maritime containers do not yet appear to play a significant role in their smuggling.

6.4.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

The 5 seizures reported in 2008 were slightly higher than the 3 reported the previous year. The largest quantity, 1,239 kg morphine (in the form of codeine), was intercepted by Russian Customs in the Port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea en-route to Kazakhstan via Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia. There were 3 heroin seizures totaling 51 kg in Australia, Ireland and Kuwait, and a seizure of 1.8 kg opium, also in Kuwait.

Table 6.12: Opiates, number of seizures and quantity

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (kg)
Russia	1	1,239
Australia	1	28
Kuwait	2	15
Ireland	1	10
Total	5	1,292

6.4.2. OPIATE ROUTINGS

4 countries appeared as destination countries namely Kuwait (twice), Australia, Ireland and Kazakhstan.

Table 6.13: Opiate departure and destination countries by quantity (kg)

Departure	Destination	Heroin	Morphine	Opium
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan		1,239	
Indonesia	Australia	28		
Iran	Kuwait			2
Pakistan	Kuwait	13		
Unknown	Ireland	10		

6.4.3. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER LOADS

The category "in freight" was used to describe the method of concealment in all 5 seizures. One of these was the seizure by Australian Customs, working with other law enforcement agencies, of 28 kg heroin found concealed in the tops of three wooden chest of drawers in a shipment originating in Indonesia. It subsequently resulted in the arrest of four suspects and in the seizure of more than USD 1 million in cash.

The category of cover load used to smuggle heroin in the two other seizures were “car parts” and “electronic appliances” (neon lights); machinery was the cover load for a shipment of opium.

6.5. Psychotropic Drugs

6.5.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED


Compared to 2007 there was a fall in the reported number of seizures from 20 to 13. However, the total amount seized increased significantly from 415 kg to 6,372 kg due in part to the interception of 3.5 million amphetamine tablets weighing 1,192 kg in the Port of Hodeida, Yemen.

Table 6.14: Psychotropic drugs, number of seizures and quantity

Country	Seizures	Quantity (kg)
Australia	8	3,512
Yemen	2	1,792
Philippines	2	770
Japan	1	299
Total	13	6,372

Seizures of amphetamine reached 1,792 kg, while those of MDMA (ecstasy) amounted to 287 kg. There were 4 methamphetamine seizures totaling 1,281 kg. The category “other” included a seizure made by Australian Customs of more than 3,000 liters gamma-Butyrolactone (GBL), a precursor and a substitute for the date rape drug gamma-Hydroxybutyric acid (GHB).

Graph 6.5: Type of seized psychotropic drugs (kg)



6.5.2. DEPARTURE / DESTINATION COUNTRIES AND ROUTINGS

Only 4 countries reported seizures: Australia featured in more than 60% of the total number of seizures (8) and more than 50% of the total quantity (3,512 kg) seized. Five countries were recorded as destination countries; two were in the category "unknown". Australia was the final destination country for 8 seizures. Unlike previous drug categories there is insufficient data in CEN to make a more in-depth analysis.

6.5.3. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER LOADS

The method of concealment in 11 out of the total numbers of seizures (13) was categorized "in freight". One of the 2 seizures in the Philippines was described "in premises" following the discovery of 660 kg methamphetamine in a maritime container.

One of the more interesting cover loads in 2 seizures reported by the Australian Customs Service was foot spas. The first resulted in the seizure of 27 kg cocaine and 27 kg methamphetamine; the second in 124 kg cocaine, 66 kg methyl-amphetamine, and 121 kg MDMA (ecstasy). Both concealments were in the fiberglass bases of the foot spas shipped from Canada. The seizures and subsequent arrests in Australia were the direct result of inter agency cooperation between Customs and Federal Police, and collaboration with the relevant agencies in Canada.



(Courtesy of Australian Customs Service)



(Courtesy of Australian Customs Service)

6.6. KHAT

Khat is a flowering plant, mainly grown for use as a stimulant in the Horn of Africa and parts of the Arabian Peninsula especially Yemen. The leaves and tops are normally chewed fresh or, less frequently, dried and consumed as tea. Khat is not currently under international control and its legal status depends to a large extent on national legislation. In some parts of the world, e.g. in The Netherlands, it can be legally purchased without any restrictions.

Since the best stimulant effect is usually obtained when the leaves/tops are fresh, khat is usually smuggled via air transport rather than slower maritime routes. There were no reported seizures in maritime containers in 2007 and only a single seizure of 27 kg in 2006.

Two seizures were by the New Zealand Customs Service 2008. The first (65 kg) was discovered in the base of lounge suites being shipped in a container from Australia to Wellington and the second (68 kg) in Christchurch. The method of concealment and country of departure were identical. Investigation revealed that the two shipments were linked and the smuggling organized by a Somalian national.

7. Precursor Chemicals

This section covers the reported seizures of chemicals and precursors frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has prepared a list to assist in the identification of the substances scheduled in Tables I and II of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. This list is available on the INCB website (see Section 13 for further details). Additionally, the WCO CEN website contains details of the 22 most commonly smuggled substances.

7.1.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

There was a significant increase in the total number of seizures (12) compared to the previous year (7). The 3 RILO regions reporting these seizures were Asia/Pacific, CIS, and South America. Asia/Pacific was the most active region with a total of 8 seizures, 7 of which were pseudoephedrine a precursor used in the production of methamphetamine. Australia reported 3 seizures of pseudoephedrine totaling 699 kg and New Zealand 4 seizures totaling 499 kg.

Some of the seizures confirm traffickers are turning to pharmaceutical preparations to circumvent the control of pseudoephedrine in its raw form. New Zealand Customs Service reported 3 large and separate seizures of Contac NT, a pseudoephedrine based tablet, all in containerized freight originating in China. In the first case 300 kg was discovered in plastic drawer sets, followed by another seizure of 80 kg in packaged foodstuffs, and finally 112 kg in a shipment of furniture. The latter was, at the time, the third largest seizure of its kind in New Zealand sufficient to produce 28 kg methamphetamine.

7.1.2. DEPARTURE COUNTRIES AND ROUTINGS

China, as in previous years, featured as the departure county in 41% of the total number of seizures. Thailand appeared in 3 seizures, all shipped to Australia. As for remaining departure countries, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was reported once for a shipment of 252 kg acetone destined for Russia; Japan was the departure country for 12 kg acetone destined for Russia. New Zealand and Australia were the destinations in 60% of the total number both with 4 reported seizures followed by 2 cases in Russia. Ecuador reported the seizure of 20,000 kg acetic acid (see photo) from China.



(Courtesy of CGSA, Ecuador)



(Courtesy of CGSA, Ecuador)

Table 7.1: Departure and destination country by total amount seized (kg)

Departure	Destination	Acetic acid	Acetone	Pseudo-ephedrine	Norephedrine
China	Ecuador	20,000			
China	New Zealand			299	
Japan	Russia		12		
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Russia		252		
Thailand	Australia			1,550	

7.1.3. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER LOADS

With the exception of 2 cases reported by Australia and Russia “in transport”, the method of concealment in the majority of cases was “in freight”.

Specific cover loads were reported in 7 seizures and included ceramics (2), food (2), furniture (1), medical equipment (1) and water heater (1). Under the food category one of the cover loads used was fruit juice and the other milk powder; both involved the smuggling of pseudoephedrine. The category of cover load in 4 other seizures was recorded as “unknown”. No cover load was used in the shipment of acetic acid seized in Ecuador.

One of the seizures in Australia was 850 kg pseudoephedrine in white tablets discovered inside the statue of an elephant (see photo), a marble box and brass stools shipped in 3 containers that had arrived in Port Botany (Sydney) from Thailand. This successful operation involved the Australian Customs Service, Australian Federal Police and New South Wales Crime Commission and resulted in a number of arrests and the seizure of more pseudoephedrine (25 kg) and a substantial amount of cash.



(Courtesy of Australian Customs Service)



(Courtesy of Australian Customs Service)

8. Cigarettes and Tobacco

The analysis in this section covers the reported smuggling in maritime containers of cigarettes, smoking tobacco and water-pipe tobacco. There is a separate analysis (paragraph 8.4) dealing with the smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes and related products. For a more detailed analysis please refer to the WCO Customs and Tobacco Report 2008.


8.1. Cigarettes

8.1.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND AMOUNT SEIZED

Only 24 countries reported the seizure of cigarettes, a significant decrease in both the number of reported seizures and the quantity intercepted compared with the previous two years. The number of reported seizures fell to 135 compared with 183 seizures in 2007 and 186 in 2006. The quantity of cigarettes seized was just 771,398,081 compared to 924,405,021 in 2007 and 1,408,959,130 in 2006.

As in previous years Western Europe was the primary market for smuggled cigarettes due in part to higher taxes and retail prices. Spain, consistent with the past 3 years, recorded the highest total amount seized as well as the most number of seizures followed by The Netherlands, Israel, Italy, Greece and Ireland. However, the number of seizures reported in this region has shown a significant decline over the past 3 years. Spain for example reported only 28 seizures compared with 41 the previous year and 37 in 2006. In Greece there were only 8 seizures in 2008 compared to 13 the previous year.

Graph 8.1: Number of seizures (in parenthesis) and quantity by country



8.1.2. CIGARETTE BRANDS

Of the identified brands Marlboro was by far the most frequently seized both in terms of the number of seizures (41) and total quantity seized (303,176,356). The brand name in 49 seizures is recorded as either "other" or "unknown".

Table 8.1: Top ten brands of smuggled cigarettes

Brand	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
<i>Marlboro</i>	41	303,176,356
<i>Lambert & Butler</i>	11	85,142,005
<i>Regal</i>	7	33,214,000
<i>Marlboro Light</i>	6	29,690,000
<i>Memphis</i>	1	20,000,000
<i>LM</i>	8	16,872,620
<i>Benson & Hedges</i>	4	16,250,000
<i>Chesterfield</i>	4	10,104,200
<i>Raquel</i>	1	9,060,000
<i>Superkings</i>	3	7,621,800

8.1.3. DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES

China was again the most frequently reported departure country in terms of both the number of seizures (90) and the total amount seized (560,839,761), representing almost 67% and 73% of the respective totals. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) featured as the departure country for the second highest quantity of cigarettes (89,236,000); but significantly lower than China. Cigarettes shipped from the UAE were mainly destined for Hungary and intercepted in the Port of Koper, Slovenia. The third ranked departure country was the Philippines due to one large single seizure of 38,220,000 cigarettes in Singapore en-route to Greece.

Table 8.2: Top ten departure countries by quantity seized

Departure country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
China	90	560,839,761
United Arab Emirates	9	89,236,000
Philippines	1	38,220,000
Indonesia	14	25,894,600
Panama	2	19,780,000
Turkey	4	10,010,000
Belgium	1	9,060,000
Vietnam	2	8,540,000
Malaysia	1	6,800,000
Russia	5	2,708,000

Spain was the destination country for the majority of seizures (27) all of which originated in China followed by Ireland. Most of the shipments into Ireland originated in Indonesia and were the result of international cooperation between Irish and French Customs. Cigarettes from China also featured in 7 seizures in the Port of Ashdod in Israel.

Rotterdam (The Netherlands), Ashdod (Israel) and Dublin (Ireland) were the top 3 ports in terms of quantities seized reporting a combined total of 239,858,400 cigarettes. 90% of all recorded seizures in The Netherlands took place in the Port of Rotterdam.


Table 8.3: Top ten destination countries by quantity seized

Destination country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
Spain	27	145,173,065
Greece	9	106,150,000
Netherlands	10	84,621,200
Israel	7	74,660,000
Ireland	17	52,220,000
Italy	8	38,774,000
Belgium	9	38,521,500
Hungary	4	24,515,600
Chile	2	19,780,000
Germany	8	19,295,300

8.1.4. CONCEALMENT METHODS AND COVER LOADS

The method of concealment in the majority of seizures (103) was reported as "in freight" followed by 31 seizures "in transport".

Australian Customs Service reported a number of significant seizures throughout the year. The largest featured 12.9 million *Marlboro* and other brand named cigarettes, as well as 284 kg pouch tobacco, concealed inside machine rolls of paper and water heaters (see photos), intercepted in the Port of Freemantle. In another case, 3 million cigarettes were intercepted in Sydney, Australia, in cargo said to contain household wares and stationery followed by another operation in the same port resulting in the seizure of 1.7 million cigarettes in a cover load of glass. All three shipments originated in China and the potential revenue loss is estimated at almost US\$ 3.5 million.



(Courtesy of Australian Customs Service)

The most commonly used cover load (27 seizures), including many of those in Ireland, was reported under the category “furniture”. Irish Customs seized more than 6,000,000 cigarettes (*Raquel Classic* and *Gold Classic* brand) from a container that arrived at Waterford Port from Zeebrugge, Belgium. The declared cover load was toys but the cigarettes were packed in plain brown cardboard boxes of children’s hair clips loaded on 22 pallets.

“Electronic appliances” appeared as the cover load in 7 seizures. In 27 seizures the category “other” was used for cover loads that could not be specifically determined. In 10 seizures the cartons of cigarettes had simply been placed on pallets and hidden behind rather than inside the cover load.

Table 8.4: Type of reported cover loads by total quantity

Cover load	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
Unknown	42	302,425,496
Other	26	139,555,600
Furniture	24	121,420,020
Electronic appliances	7	53,719,200
No cover load	10	50,774,865
Plastics	5	34,024,300
Textiles	3	28,000,000
Ceramics	3	10,727,800
Building materials	2	9,646,000
Machinery	1	9,618,000
Food	1	9,330,000
Glassware	4	2,156,800
Total	128	771,398,081

8.2. Smoking Tobacco

There were only 2 reported seizures of smoking tobacco compared to 10 the previous year. The total amount seized was also considerably less. The largest seizure, 2,462 kg *Narghile* brand smoking tobacco, was intercepted by Italian Customs in the Port of Genoa concealed amongst wooden furniture shipped from Egypt. The second was a seizure of 24 kg by the Australian Customs Service in the Port of Fremantle and shipped from the UAE.

There were 3 seizures under the category "other". Australian Customs intercepted 284 kg *Benson & Hedges* brand loose tobacco in the Port of Fremantle shipped from China, and 4,300 kg cut tobacco in a shipment of garbage bags originating in the Philippines. An additional case featured the seizure of 192,000 pieces of cigarette paper by Norwegian Customs in the Port of Oslo in a shipment originating in China.

8.3. Water-Pipe Tobacco

Water-pipe tobacco is smoked in "hookah" pipes and during the last decade has become popular in Europe and North America especially amongst young adults. There were 4 reported seizures of water-pipe tobacco totaling 10,029 kg all of which took place in the Port of Genoa, Italy. The cover load in 3 of these seizures was wooden furniture, and in one it was water-pipes. The largest and most significant of these seizures, resulting in the discovery of 3,309 kg, was the direct result of Customs and Police cooperation. Egypt was the reported country of origin in all 4 seizures.

8.4. Counterfeit Cigarettes

There was dramatic decrease in the seizure of counterfeit cigarette products in maritime containers with only 4 seizures being recorded in 2008 compared with 77 seizures the previous year. The reason for the downward trend is not clear but may be the result of low market prices of certain genuine brand named cigarettes.

A total of 1,483,500 counterfeit *Marlboro* brand cigarettes were intercepted in 2 of the 4 reported seizures; 1,000,000 in Beirut, Lebanon and 483,500 in Aqaba, Jordan. Both shipments had arrived from China. A third case at Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea was the result of Customs and Police cooperation leading to the seizure of 437 cartons of counterfeit *Pall Mall* cigarettes shipped from China. The fourth seizure featured 120,000 pieces of counterfeit *Rizla* cigarette papers intercepted in the Port of Felixstowe, United Kingdom; the country of departure is not known.

Dutch Customs reported the seizure of 10,000,000 counterfeit cigarettes at a warehouse in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, having previously been shipped in a container. The method of concealment was recorded under the category "in premises". Further investigation resulted in the discovery of an additional 10,000,000 counterfeit cigarettes in another container also in Rotterdam.

9. Endangered Species


The WCO has dedicated 2009 to environmental issues. The theme was launched at WCO Headquarters on 26 January, the date that the customs community celebrates International Customs Day each year. The growing illegal trade in environmentally sensitive goods has prompted the global community to adopt international and regional Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) with trade provisions to protect the environment. Starting from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1975, the number of these trade-related MEAs have grown steadily over the years: the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances in 1989; the Basel Convention on hazardous wastes in 1992; and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997.

The category “Endangered Species” is included in the Global Container Analysis Report for the first time as more data becomes available suggesting that maritime containers are regularly used for the illicit trafficking of bulk quantities of species protected by CITES. The various species of fauna referred to in this report are mammals (of the class Mammalian), reptiles (of the class Reptilian), arthropods (invertebrate animals including insects, spiders and crustaceans), and finally fish.

9.1.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES

There were a total of 17 seizures in 2008 reported by 7 different countries: France (FR), Hong Kong, China (HK), India (IN), Italy (IT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL) and Russia (RU). France reported the most seizures (6), followed by India (3) and Italy (3). There were 11 seizures of fauna and 6 seizures of flora.

Graph 8.1: Number of CITES seizures by species and country



9.1.2. SEIZURES OF FAUNA

A total of 43 items in the **Mammalian** category were intercepted by 3 countries: Italy, France and Russia. Italy reported the seizure of 31 pieces of elephant ivory in the Port of Genoa in a shipment arriving from Equatorial Guinea. French Customs seized 2 pieces of elephant ivory shipped from Madagascar in the Port of Le Havre; one leopard skin at an inland location (Grand Couronne) originating in the Republic of Guinea; and 5 carvings made from elephant ivory in Port de Bouc in southern France shipped from Cameroon. Russian Customs discovered 4 bats of the *Pteropodidae* species in the Port of St. Petersburg; the country of origin is not known.

Polish Customs officials in the Port of Gdynia seized a shipment of Chinese pharmaceutical products (see photos) from Indonesia comprising 20 million tablets in boxes labelled Ginjal, a herbal preparation made from a protected seahorse in the **Fish** category of the genus *Hippocampus sp.*



(Courtesy of Polish Customs)



(Courtesy of Polish Customs)

There were 4 reported **Reptilian** seizures by 2 countries: France and Italy. French Customs at Port de Bouc detected 11 pieces of various reptile skin products shipped from Cameroon. They also seized 2 live turtles of the *Testudinidae* family shipped from Morocco to Italy via the French Port of Sete. Italian Customs officers in the Port of Genoa seaport discovered a similar live turtle shipped from Tunisia, as well as 472 articles made from python skin and shipped from Senegal.

There were 2 reported seizures of **Arthropods**. Indian Customs at the Port of Mumbai seized 1,149 kg organ pipe coral in a shipment of imported rock salt. The other case involved 5 pieces of stony coral seized in the Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands; the country of origin is not known.

9.1.3. SEIZURES OF FLORA

All 4 reported seizures of flora were wood, 3 of which were red sandalwood aka red sanders wood from the CITES listed species *Pterocarpus santalinus* used for carvings and in the manufacture of musical instruments and furniture.

Indian customs intercepted 2 export shipments of red sandalwood: 21,510 kg in the port of Kolkata destined for Malaysia and declared as bricks; and a total of 19,000 kg in 2 containers in the port of Mumbai, one en route to China and the other to Dubai. The third seizure, 25,380 kg, was detected by Chinese Customs in Hong Kong, China, inside two 20' containers mis-declared as rosewood shipped from Malaysia.

The fourth seizure was a shipment from Cameroon of 57,830 kg African teak wood by French Customs in the Port of Blainville sur Orne, France, en route to Belgium.

10. Counterfeit Products

The trafficking of counterfeit products, including intellectual property right (IPR) material, is an increasing worldwide phenomenon valued at USD 700 billion annually. Those involved are driven by the high profits and low risks associated with the activity. The economic harm through lost revenue is significant. There is also social harm and health risks, particularly with pharmaceutical products, mechanical components and clothing since all are likely to be produced with substandard materials.

This section includes all counterfeit products including IPR material shipped in maritime containers excluding counterfeit cigarettes which are covered in section 8 of this report. More extensive analysis information can be found in the 2008 WCO counterfeiting report.

To appreciate the scope of smuggled counterfeit products all the data presented in the tables and charts is expressed in terms of the number of pieces. To comprehend the scale of the problem the value of the seized goods, converted automatically by the system into US dollars, is also shown. Consistent with previous reports one pair of seized shoes is converted into 2 units or pieces. Insignificant seizure quantities (litres, boxes, cartoons) have not been considered.

10.1.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

A total of 32 countries reported 2,422 seizures. The amount of seizures increased significantly compared to 1,670 in 2007 and 1,332 in 2006.

When considering the relevant data it is important to note that the interception of just one container usually involves the seizure of several types of counterfeit products. Consequently there may be several types of goods recorded under the same unique CEN identification number; for the purposes of this analysis each is treated as a separate seizure. In one reported seizure in the Port of Choburi in Thailand for example, there were 36 different commodity types (watches, textiles, mobile phones, etc.) and a combined total of 42,068 pieces.

Table 10.1: Counterfeit products by country, number of seizures, quantity and value

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)	Value (USD)
Netherlands	254	69,015,554	115,012,009
Denmark	20	5,785,471	4,329,780
Kenya	6	4,980,002	9,985,910
Italy	106	4,916,721	13,766,118
Estonia	84	3,189,136	716,207,890
Malta	38	1,886,765	41,738,478
Belgium	18	1,728,864	21,418,740
Romania	180	1,340,575	unknown
Finland	20	1,188,730	8,860,245

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)	Value (USD)
Chile	161	874,970	38,023,639
UK	416	840,358	38,248,826
Hong Kong, China	21	670,762	13,143,280
Australia	662	508,083	17,920,220
Thailand	70	448,390	9,009,980
Sweden	51	414,451	10,691,050
Germany	41	308,223	33,268 810
France	16	289,367	2,343,213
Russia	2	281,832	unknown
Israel	20	201,311	3, 862,160
Ecuador	16	155,843	29
Slovenia	4	76,612	5,300
Greece	17	72,864	2,624,003
Norway	91	31,709	3,914,631
Portugal	7	25,237	143,330
Ireland	3	19,076	2,489,000
Brazil	2	18,438	1,514,750
Estonia	91	15,062	unknown
Kuwait	3	6,951	266,880
Latvia	1	1,320	6,000
Paraguay	1	795	unknown
Total	2,422	99,293,472	1,108,794,271

The Netherlands reported the highest total quantity, 69,015,554 pieces, which represents 70% of the total amount of counterfeit products seized worldwide during 2008. This high number was due to several significant seizures by Customs officers in the Port of Rotterdam including 14,580,765 pieces (mostly games and toys) seized in a shipment from China en-route to Ireland, and 5,790,000 pieces of stickers bearing the *Disney* trademark. The latter was the largest seizure of one particular commodity in 2008.

Australia reported the highest number of seizures (662) followed by the UK (416) and The Netherlands (254). A number of countries reported a significant decrease in the number of seizures compared to the previous year. Germany for example reported 41 down from 203, and Portugal 7 down from 117. Chile, UK and Australia appeared for the first time in the top 6 countries for seizures.

In **South America**, Chile reported the highest number of seizures (161) totaling 874,970 pieces followed by Ecuador (16) seizing 155,843 pieces. In **Asia/Pacific** region, apart from Australia there were significant contributions from Thailand with 70 seizures totaling 448,390 pieces as well as Hong Kong, China, with 670,762 pieces from 21 seizures. In **Eastern/Central Europe**, Romania reported 180 seizures in the Black Seaport of Constantza totaling 1,340,535 pieces. This high number of seizures placed Romania in the top six countries. In **Eastern/Southern Africa**, Kenya reported 6 seizures totaling 4,980,002 pieces including one seizure of 4,920,000 counterfeit ball pens in containerized freight intercepted at Port of Kilindini (Mombasa). These outstanding results put Kenya in third place worldwide in terms of total amounts seized. In the **Middle East**, Kuwait reported 3 seizures totaling 6,951 pieces of children's clothing, paper gifts and school bags.

There were 3 significant seizures reported by weight rather than by the number of pieces: 9,876 kg sport shoes bearing trademark *Nike* seized in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, en-route to Italy with a total value of more than USD 1,700,000; 7,440 kg toys bearing trademarks *Viacom International* and *Warner* intercepted by Greek Customs at the Port of Thessaloniki; and 119,396 kg laminated floor boarding and PVC padding seized in Russia.

The total value of seized counterfeit products exceeded USD 1 billion. This amount is based upon the value of the genuine product and is an estimate; the final figure may be much higher since the value of seized goods in several cases had not been assessed at the time of reporting. Spain reported the seizure of 1,000,000 counterfeit watches comprising 24 different trademarks valued together at USD 500,000,000 in the Port of Malaga.

10.1.2. TYPES OF COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS

The category of counterfeit IPR goods most often seized was "phonographic products". The Dutch Customs at the port of Rotterdam made the majority of seizures under this category, as well as the largest single seizure, 4,000,000 pieces recordable compact discs (CD-R) bearing *Philips* trademark shipped from China. The highest number of seizures was recorded under the category "textiles". The brand name Adidas was most commonly found in seized IPR textile material; Spain reported the largest seizure: 41,000 Adidas t-shirts in the Port of Algeciras.

The category "International Sport Events" relates to products bearing the labels and/or logos of official sporting events. Slovenian Customs in the Port of Koper seized 39,900 footballs bearing the official logo of *UEFA EURO 2008*. Russian Customs reported 2 seizures in the Black Seaport of Novorossiysk, both originating in China. The first case involved the discovery in 3 containers of a shipment of head scarves, hats, woven handbags, beach mats, beach bags; all bearing symbols of the Olympic Games and the logo *SOCHI-2014* (see photos). The city of Sochi, selected to host the XXII Winter Olympic Games in 2014, is also on the Black Sea. The second case featured the seizure of laminated floor boarding and PVC padding material which, upon closer examination were found to bear the Olympic Games symbols and the words *Olympic Special* on the packaging of the goods. The logos and symbols of the Olympic Games are registered in the Customs IPR Register and are protected by the Customs.¹

¹ Information obtained from RILO Commonwealth of Independent States



(Courtesy of Russian Customs)



(Courtesy of Russian Customs)

Table 10.2: Categories of counterfeit products

Category	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
Phonographic products	89	60,597,707
Games and toys	234	15,419,800
Other - specify	59	10,441,624
Mobile phones	61	2,974,029
Textiles	720	2,251,129
Footwear	313	1,841,549
Toiletries-cosmetics	93	1,727,608
Accessories	609	1,438,068
Watches	110	1,289,258
Beverages	1	458,694
Spare parts	35	256,657
International events - Olympic Games	7	255,859
Electronic appliances	66	248,552
Foodstuff	7	67,748
Pharmaceutical products	1	14,400
Computer accessories	16	10,778
Furniture	1	12
Total	2,422	99,293,472

10.1.3. DEPARTURE COUNTRIES AND ROUTINGS

A total of 29 countries were recorded as the country of departure for seized counterfeit products. China featured most often (70%) in terms of both the number of seizures (602) and quantity (70,606,929) followed by Chinese Taipei with 19 seizures totaling 14,025,866.

Table 10.3: Top five DEPARTURE countries

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
China	602	70,606,929
Chinese Taipei	19	14,025,866
Egypt	2	4,324,656
Japan	6	4,309,400
United Arab Emirates	16	2,285,342

The majority of seized counterfeit products were destined for Germany, Ireland and the UK. In fact eight out of the top ten destination countries are in Europe.

Table 10.4: Top five DESTINATION countries

Country	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
Germany	96	41,574,471
Ireland	8	14,65,824
Great Britain	131	7,420,838
Denmark	20	5,785,471
Morocco	9	5,113,851

As for countries of origin of counterfeit products, approximately 40% came from China while almost 50% of countries of origin were reported as "unknown".

10.1.4. CONCEALMENT METHODS AND COVER LOADS

"In freight" was the most typical method of concealment reported in 748 of 918 seizures; "in transport" was reported in 49 seizures; 2 were shown as "in premises". In 114 cases the counterfeit products were not concealed. Cover loads are not often used to conceal counterfeit products; in fact 576 seizures were confirmed as without any type of cover load. There were only 24 seizures in which a cover load was specifically indicated: 8 under the category "bags" reported mainly by Italy of shipments originating from China, and 5 seizures reported by Spain under the category "wooden statues".

11. Other Categories

11.1. Currency

This smuggling of currency is often related to illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and/or the financing of terrorism. Air transport facilitates the fast movement of currency, but as with illicit drugs and other contraband, maritime routes and containers allow for bulk shipments of cash.

There were a total of 15 reported currency seizures smuggled by means of maritime transport. In the majority of these seizures it is unclear if the currency was actually concealed in a maritime container. The only confirmed seizure recorded on CEN was 3,194,000 Philippine peso coins (USD 57,146) found inside a 20' container arriving at Kwai Chung seaport, Hong Kong, China, from Manila, Philippines.

In an interesting and high profile with probable links to drug trafficking, Customs officials in the port of Manzanillo, Mexico discovered USD 11,963,385 in paper currency concealed in boxes of plastic shelving in an export container being shipped to Panama. This case is not yet reported in CEN but is mentioned because of the means of transport, amount of cash involved, and the routing.



(Courtesy of Mexican Customs)

11.2. Arms and Ammunition


11.2.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND QUANTITY SEIZED

There were 35 seizures reported by 5 countries during 2008. Although the number of seizures increased slightly compared with 27 seizures the previous year, the number of reporting countries fell significantly.

Germany reported the largest number of seizures, the majority of which took place in the port of Hamburg and involved mainly air guns, soft air guns and knives. In 3 seizures air rifles were concealed in furniture removals. The most significant quantity seized was 110,000 rounds of civil ammunition shipped from the Philippines via Germany with Armenia as the country of final destination.

In Denmark, Customs and Police cooperation resulted in the seizure of 27 pistols, a revolver and a rifle in the front and back seat of a car in containerized freight (see image) shipped from the USA.

France reported the seizure of 6 pieces of sub-machine guns in the seaport of La Ciotat in cargo shipped from the USA. Nigeria reported the seizure of 7,500 rounds of civil ammunition, 2 rapid-fire weapons and 5 handguns in the port of Tin Can Island. This was an internal shipment not linked with other countries. A seizure of 3,306 rounds of civil ammunition was reported by Russia shipped from China. Another Russian seizure featured 68 kg of civil ammunition (cartridges) intercepted in the seaport of Korsacov in a consignment from the Republic of Korea.



(Courtesy of Danish Customs)

Table 11.1: Arms and ammunition seizures

Country	Unit	Number of seizures	Quantity (pieces)
Germany	Pieces	28	144,229
France	Pieces	1	6
Nigeria	Pieces	3	7,507
Russia	Pieces	1	3,306
Russia	Kg	1	68
Denmark	Pieces	1	29

11.2.2. ROUTINGS OF WEAPONS

A total of 8 countries were recorded in the CEN database as departure countries. Almost half the total number of seizures departed from China (17) followed by the USA (7) as indicated in the following table:

Table 11.2: Departure countries

Departure Country	Number of seizures
China	17
USA	7
Nigeria	3
Switzerland	2
Panama	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Republic of Korea	1
Philippines	1
Total	35

The top destination country was the Czech Republic where seizures mainly involved air guns and accessories produced in China and Chinese Taipei. Germany ranked second, seized similar items shipped primarily from the USA.

Table 11.3: Destination countries

Destination Country	Number of seizures
Czech Republic	15
Germany	9
Nigeria	3
Russia	2
Sweden	2
Armenia	1
France	1
Hungary	1

11.3. Evasion of Taxes and Customs Duties

11.3.1. NUMBER OF SEIZURES AND VALUE OF THE SEIZED GOODS

A total of 13 countries reported the seizure in maritime containers of commodities in this category. Two of the top 5 countries of seizure are in South America and 2 in Africa.

Over 40% of the total number of seizures were reported by Uruguay (205) followed by Kenya (138). Most of the seizures made by Uruguayan Customs were in the category "textiles" and "machinery & electrical appliances". Kenya was the top ranked country in terms of the total value of goods seized (USD 22,725,545) involving mainly spare vehicle parts (40 seizures) and vehicles (34 seizures) imported from Japan. Spain also featured in the top 5 countries as a result of one seizure of 552 boxes of blue jeans valued at approximately USD 1,524,000 in containerized freight in Madrid.

Table 11.4: Top five countries of seizure

Country	Number of seizures	Value (USD)
Kenya	138	22,725,545
Uruguay	205	7,227,603
Argentina	44	6,563,244
Mauritius	12	1,721,979
Spain	1	1,524,000

11.3.2. REGIONAL OVERVIEW

A total of 6 of the 11 RILO regions reported seizures of commodities in connection with evasions of taxes and customs duties in maritime containers. The vast majority of seizures (85%) were recorded in just 2 regions; **Eastern/Southern Africa** and **South America** with a combined total value of USD 38,471,390. These included the seizures made in Uruguay and Kenya as previously indicated. There were just 2 seizures in **Western Europe** value together at USD 1,500,000 namely the afore mentioned seizure in Spain plus a shipment of 225,700 pieces of fluorescent lamps from China valued at approximately USD 143,320 intercepted in the port of La Spezia, Italy. The port of Colombo in Sri Lanka was responsible for 34 of the 36 seizures in the **Asia/Pacific region** with most of the goods, worth approximately USD 630,442, originating in China or Pakistan. Jordan and Qatar were the 2 countries in the **Middle East** that reported seizures comprising mainly textiles and mechanical/electrical appliances valued together at USD 447,082 in the ports of Aquaba and Doha respectively. Romania was the only reporting country in **Eastern/Central Europe** seizing mainly foodstuff and mechanical & electrical appliances valued together at USD 240,000 in the port of Constantza.

Table 11.5: Regional seizures


RILO region	Number of seizures	Value (USD)
Eastern and Southern Africa	152	24,680,543
South America	249	13,790,847
Western Europe	2	1,667,320
Asia and the Pacific	36	979,713
Middle East	25	447,082
Eastern and Central Europe	7	241,541
Total	471	41,807,046

11.3.3. CATEGORIES OF THE SEIZED GOODS

The category "other" was used to describe more than 40% of the seized goods. Since this category has been used to describe hundreds of different items the data cannot be analysed precisely.

The two other main categories of seized goods are "mechanical & electrical appliances" and "textiles" with a combined value in excess of USD 20,500,000.

Graph 11.1: Categories of seized goods by value (USD)



11.3.4. DEPARTURE COUNTRIES AND ROUTINGS

China and Thailand were the 2 most commonly reported departure countries representing over 37% of the total number of seizures. The UK ranked third mainly as a result of seizures in Kenya and Uruguay of imported electrical goods including personal computers, hard disk drives and laptop computer, as well as 430,800 kg sugar valued at USD 171,435.

Table 11.6: Top 5 departure countries

Departure country	Number of seizures	Value (USD)
China	170	139,751,361
Thailand	6	69,659,461
UK	16	114,066,509
UAE	17	54,053,923
Japan	52	37,914,207


Kenya was the top ranked destination country with 113 seizures of imported goods valued together at USD 22,152,936 followed by Uruguay and Argentina.

Table 11.7: Top five destination countries

Destination country	Number of seizures	Value (USD)
Kenya	113	22,152,936
Uruguay	201	6,976,248
Argentina	41	6,530,070
Mauritius	12	1,721,979
Spain	2	1,524,000

11.3.5. METHODS OF CONCEALMENT AND COVER LOADS

The method of concealment in 264 out of 471 seizures was in the category “in freight” whilst “in transport” was reported in 29 seizures; no method of concealment was reported in 98 seizures. Following scanning, 2 undeclared vehicles were found in a container arriving in Kenya from the UK. Cover loads are not commonly used in cases related to the evasion of taxes and customs duties and 2008 was no exception.



(Courtesy of Kenya Customs)

12. Special Items

12.1. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

As previously mentioned the data analysis is based entirely upon information reported by WCO Members to CEN via their respective RILO. Since Canada currently does not yet belong to a specific RILO region this report is supplemented by additional information provided to the WCO Secretariat by the CBSA. The reported seizures demonstrate not only the extent to which maritime containers continue to be used to smuggle large quantities of illicit drugs including opiates and other types of contraband but also the effectiveness of inter-agency and cross border cooperation.

12.1.1. ILLICIT DRUGS (COCAINE)

In a joint operation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other local/regional police services, CBSA reported the largest seizure in 2008 of 276 kg cocaine at the Port of St John, New Brunswick. The cocaine was found concealed in the cardboard dividers of cardboard boxes in a consignment of bottles of hot sauce arriving from Guyana (see photos).



(Courtesy of CBSA)



(Courtesy of CBSA)

Following the 276 kg seizure in New Brunswick, Canada and as a direct result of international cooperation, another container en-route from Guyana to Canada was intercepted by the US authorities in the Port of St. Croix, US Virgin Islands resulting in the seizure of 100 kg cocaine concealed in cardboard dividers in an identical shipment of hot sauce.

12.1.2. ILLICIT DRUGS (OPIATES)

The quantity of heroin seized (127 kg) in Canada increased for the 7th consecutive year with the majority of seizures in air transport (37 kg) and courier services (25 kg). However the largest single seizure (28 kg) was reported in a maritime container targeted for inspection in the Port of Halifax. Small packages of heroin were discovered in a shipment of boxes of towels (see photo) originating in Pakistan in the hollowed out layers of cardboard that formed the sides of some of the boxes.

CBSA also reported 62 seizures of opium totaling 176 kg by various transport modes. The largest single seizure however was 121 kg in a maritime container in the Port of Vancouver concealed in the bottom of jars of black olives originating in Turkey. This was the largest seizure of opium in Canada since 2001 and highlights the threat of maritime containers being used for large shipments of drugs.



12.1.3. ILLICIT DRUGS (CANNABIS)

(Courtesy of CBSA)

Unlike previous years there were no multi-ton seizures of cannabis in maritime containers. CBSA and RCMP worked together following the discovery of 322 kg cannabis resin concealed in the floor of 6 large wooden crates in a shipment declared as "Colis Oil Olives" arriving in the Port of Halifax from Morocco. Further investigation resulted in the arrest of 2 suspects who have since been charged with the importation of a controlled substance.

12.1.4. PRECURSOR CHEMICALS

CBSA officers in the Port of Vancouver seized 2,823 liters of 3,4-methylenedioxy-phenyl-2-propanone (MDP2P) in a shipment of liquid sodium peroxide, a corrosive agent, originating in China. The precursor was concealed in particular 55-gallon drums indicated by brown packing tape affixed to the container walls (see photos). MDP2P is a precursor used in the production of MDMA (Ecstasy).




(Courtesy of CBSA)



(Courtesy of CBSA)

Equally significant was the seizure of 223 kg norephedrine in a shipment from Croatia to Montreal, Canada concealed within a modified industrial metal lathe frame (see photos) in several plastic bags, each with an average weight of 25 kg. There was a similar seizure of norephedrine (188 kg) in the Port of Rijeka, Croatia en-route to Canada.



(Courtesy of CBSA)

Finally 807 kg ephedrine was seized by CBSA in the Port of Montreal. The precursor was found in 32 of the 764 bags of salt in a shipment originating in Pakistan.



(Courtesy of CBSA)

12.1.5. CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO

CBSA reported the seizure (by all transport modes) of 33,460,000 cigarettes as well as other products including chewing tobacco and Egyptian water pipe tobacco. The majority of these products, comprising counterfeit Canadian and American brand cigarettes and various Chinese and other international brands, were seized in maritime containers in shipments through the Port of Vancouver. One of the largest cigarette seizures was 10,360,000 pieces (51,800 cartons) of Chinese brand names *Furongwang* and *Shuangxi*, and counterfeit *Belmont*, *du Maurier*, *Marlboro* and *Player's* in a shipment originating in China and declared as luggage and travelers bags. According to the CBSA the majority of smuggled Chinese brand cigarettes are destined for the large Asian community in Canada in parts of British Columbia and the Greater Toronto Area.

12.2. Modus operandi "Rip Off"

A "rip off" is a concealment methodology where a legitimate shipment, usually containerized, is exploited to smuggle contraband (usually illicit drugs) from the country of origin or the transshipment port to the country of destination. In Spanish the equivalent terminology widely used by customs and law enforcement officials is "gancho ciego". Neither the shipper nor the consignee(s) is (are) aware that their shipment is being contaminated to smuggle illicit cargo. For this method to be successful there will always be local conspiracy both in the country of origin or the transshipment port as well in the country of destination.

The "rip off" modality is frequently used by cocaine smugglers. There was a significant increase in 2008 in both the number of seizures (21) and the amount seized (2,492 kg) compared to the previous year although the 2008 figures would probably be more than double if the estimated number of seizures not reported to CEN were taken into consideration. The largest individual cocaine seizures were 640 kg and 560 kg both reported by Belgium Customs. In the first seizure the cocaine was found in 10 black bags stashed loosely on top of sacks of coffee (see photo) shipped from Buenaventura, Colombia to Antwerp, Belgium via Freeport, Bahamas. In the other seizure, the cocaine was packed only in the red boxes of a shipment of blue boxes of tuna fish originating in Guayaquil, Ecuador.



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)



(Courtesy of Belgium Customs)

As time is a crucial element to avoid being detected during the course of placement or removal, the contraband is generally not very well hidden, usually placed near to the doors of the container. Sometimes the contraband is not hidden at all and simply placed on top of the legitimate cargo immediately behind the doors. In a few cases the contraband has been discovered concealed in the fourth and fifth row of the legitimate cargo.

There have also been many cases where the mechanical department of refrigerated (reefer) containers is utilized by smugglers. This comparatively small area is always accessible no matter whether the container is loaded or unloaded.

Very often a new seal duplicating the number of the original seal (see photos) assigned to the container, and noted on the commercial documents, is attached to one of the bags carrying the contraband. When the contraband reaches the country of destination or transshipment port, the local conspirator breaks the original seal, opens the door, retrieves the contraband, closes the door, and affixes the duplicate seal to the container. No legitimate cargo is stolen and the original seal number is on the container. In some cases the original broken seal is "repaired" and reaffixed on to the doors of the container.



(Courtesy of Spanish Customs)



(Courtesy of Spanish Customs)

There are 4 possible scenarios to **ADD** contraband to containerized cargo in the country of its origin or transshipment port:

- During the loading of the goods at the premises of the shipper: conspiracy of local employees of the shipper;
- During the transport from the premises of the shipper to the port of loading: conspiracy of the transport company and/or driver;
- On the terminal in the port of loading: conspiracy of: local port workers: employees who know the routing of the container (the contraband must arrive in the right port of destination) and the location of the container on the terminal;
- On the vessel during the voyage: conspiracy of crewmember(s). This scenario is only possible when the container is accessible on the vessel.

There are 4 possible scenarios to **RETRIEVE** contraband from container cargo in the country of destination or transshipment port:

- On the vessel during the voyage: conspiracy of crewmember(s). This scenario is only possible when the container is accessible on the vessel.
- On the terminal in the port of destination: conspiracy of: local port workers: employees who know the location of the container on the terminal;
- During the transport from the port of destination to the delivery address: conspiracy of the transport company and/or driver;
- During the discharge of the cargo at the premises of the consignee: conspiracy of local employees of the consignee.

The contamination of legitimate cargo using this type of concealment methodology is a serious breach of supply chain security that might result in such cargo being impounded and/or delayed as a result and at considerable financial cost.

12.3. Counterfeit Medical Products (contribution made by INTERPOL)

THE INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL PRODUCTS ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TASKFORCE – IMPACT

IMPACT is a global partnership that aims to enhance international co-operation in the fight against counterfeit medical products worldwide. Created by the World Health Organization in February 2006, IMPACT brings together WHO member states, international organizations, enforcement agencies, national drug regulatory authorities, customs and police organizations, nongovernmental organizations, associations representing pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers, health professionals and patients' groups. The current co-chairs of the IMPACT Enforcement group are INTERPOL and the Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC). All of IMPACT's activities are based around five key areas: regulatory implementation, legislative infrastructure, enforcement, technology and communications.



A global public health crisis

Counterfeit medicines represent an enormous public health challenge. They range from inactive, useless preparations to mixtures of harmful toxic substances, and are often indistinguishable from the genuine product. In all cases, counterfeit products are unreliable, their source is unknown and they are, by definition, always illegal.

Any kind of medical product can be and has been counterfeited: expensive lifestyle and anticancer medicines, antibiotics, medicines for hypertension and lowering cholesterol, hormones, steroids, inexpensive generic versions of simple painkillers and antihistamines, blood glucose test strips and condoms. In developing countries the most pressing issue is the common availability of counterfeited medicines for the treatment of life-threatening conditions such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

Even one single case of a counterfeit medicine is unacceptable; in addition to putting patients at risk and undermining public confidence, it jeopardizes the credibility of national authorities (health and enforcement alike) and the pharmaceutical supply system.

The scale of the problem

The extent of counterfeiting is impossible to quantify. In some countries, counterfeit products are a rare occurrence while in others they are an everyday reality.

Reports from developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are extremely rare and make it impossible to accurately assess the situation. In addition to significant differences between regions there can also be dramatic variations within individual countries themselves: for example, urban versus rural areas, or from one city to another.

Estimates by region:

- Most industrialized countries with effective regulatory systems and market control (e.g. Australia, Canada, most of Europe, Japan, New Zealand and the USA) have an extremely low proportion of counterfeit medicines, that equates to significantly less than 1% of the market;
- Many countries in Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America have areas where more than 30% of the medicines on sale can be counterfeit;
- In many of the countries of the former Soviet Union the proportion of counterfeit medicines is above 20% of the market;
- Medicines purchased over the Internet from illegal sites that conceal their physical address are counterfeit in more than 50% of cases.

Please note: these figures are not exact but give an indication of the possible prevalence in different parts of the world.

What fuels the illegal trade in medicines?

Counterfeiting is greatest in those regions where regulatory and legal oversight is weakest and where there is an absence of deterrent legislation. In many countries the official supply chain fails to reach all communities, putting rural and the poorer segments of the population at a particular disadvantage. This is exacerbated when prices of medicines are high as there is a greater incentive for the consumer to seek medicines outside the normal supply system.

The counterfeiting of medicines is a highly lucrative business due to the growing demand for medicines and low production costs. For example, introducing a fake erectile dysfunction medicine through the internet can give a profit of 6,000%. If introduced into the regular supply chain the profit can rise to 21,000%.

INTERPOL – IMPACT ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

Combined operational activities led by INTERPOL in 2008 are as follows:

Operation Storm: police, customs and drug regulatory agencies from eight countries participated in a six-month operation (15 April – 15 September). Specific forensic support was provided by the Health Science Authority of Singapore.

- Countries participating: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam;
- Results: 186 raids; 27 Arrests; 16,092,650 tablets seized with a value of USD 6,650,000; criminal analytical report written.

Operation Mamba: police, customs and drug regulatory agencies from two countries participated in a week-long operation (29 September – 5 October).

- Participating countries : Tanzania and Uganda;
- Results: 226 pharmacies, wholesalers, hospitals and market stalls inspected; 82 police cases opened; more than 100 different products seized; criminal analytical report written.

Operation Pangea: Internet Day of Action (12 November) organized by the Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC) and supported by INTERPOL.

- Participating countries: drug regulatory agencies from Australia, Israel, Switzerland, the UK and the USA;
- Scope: to raise awareness of the danger of buying medical products over the Internet.

Training: the IMPACT Enforcement Group trained a total of 350 law enforcement officers.

- Training for police, customs and drug regulatory officers from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam;
- A training session at an INTERPOL workshop seminar in Nairobi, Kenya with 26 Eastern and Southern African countries participating;
- A training session at an INTERPOL seminar in Rome, Italy attended by police specialists with responsibility for investigating intellectual property crime, drawn from 15 countries in North and South America, Southeast Asia and Europe.

13. Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and acronyms have been used in this report:

ANF	Anti-Narcotics Force (Pakistan)
AKA	Also Known As
BASC	Business Alliance for Secure Commerce
BOMCA	Border Management for Central Asia (EU)
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations (Ghana)
CAE	Customs Corporation (Ecuador)
CARICC	Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Centre
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CBT	Computer Based Training (UNODC)
CCP	Container Control Programme
CEN	Customs Enforcement Network
CEPS	Customs and Excise Preventative Service (Ghana)
CGSA	Contecon Guayaquil S.A.
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CONSEP	National Drug Control Commission (Ecuador)
EU	European Union
FBR	Federal Board of Revenue (Pakistan Customs)
GPHA	Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICTSI	International Container Terminal Services Inc.
IFPI	International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IMPACT	International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce
IPR	Intellectual Property Right
KPT	Karachi Port Trust (Pakistan)
NACOB	Narcotics Control Board (Ghana)
PCU	Port Control Unit
PFIPC	Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime
PNE	National Police (Ecuador)
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RILO	Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (WCO)
SAFE	Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade
SBS	State Border Service (Turkmenistan)
SCS	State Customs Service (Turkmenistan)
SDSC	State Drug Control Service (Turkmenistan)

SVA	Customs Surveillance Service (Ecuador)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UK	United Kingdom
UNICRI	UN Inter-Regional Crime and Justice Research Unit
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA	United States of America
WCO	World Customs Organization

MEASUREMENTS:

kg Kilograms

